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SUBSTANCE AND STYLE OF CABINET DECISION-MAKING
Jaakko Nousiainen
University of Turku, Finland
1. PROBLEM AND FRAMEWORK
The tenor of the scholarly discussion on political processes 
has been slowly changing over the last two decades. To the extent 
that the pluralist view of the state has given way to a more 
managerially oriented one, the interest of research and theory 
development has shifted from mass behaviour and representative 
processes towards the strategic activities of elites.- "rational 
management of post-industrial society” is the slogan of the day.
In this perspective national governments assume their place 
as the focus of attention. Compared with other institutional 
actors they have a unique role, in so far as they are not 
specialized groups - the old term ’executive’ is in today’s 
circumstances most misleading. The quality and direction of 
national policies is above all dependent on their interests and 
capabilities. The government has, it is true, also other 
functions in the political system - ceremonial, representative 
and integrative - but basically it can be perceived as a 
purposeful decision-making system, commissioned to guide social 
policies. The government’s job is to govern: in other words, to 
make major decisions of public policy, to gain acceptance for 
those decisions, and to direct their implementation.
But what do governments actually do when they govern a 
country? How do they apportion their time in this process? From 
where do they receive the impulses for action and what sort of 
factors in reality direct their agenda-building activity? To 



























































































to external stress, or - in the other extreme case - represent a 
serious attempt towards anticipatory. active problem-solving? Or 
to what extent are mere administrative routines apt to block the 
decision-making channel? To what kinds of strategies do cabinets 
resort in their interactions with the civil service, other 
domestic power factors and foreign governments. And finally how 
significant are the consequences - domestic and international- 
of the decisions made?
To be more precise. in this study we are essentially 
interested in interrelationships and covariation between the 
following factor complexes.-
(1) Substantial centers of government activities. Are the 
cabinets free to select and restrict their agenda items, those 
issues that will be submitted to serious collective 
consideration? Which national questions take first priority in 
the ministerial time budget, which is the most visible scarce 
resource of modern governments.
(2) Level of significance of issues reaching the collective 
scrutiny of ministers. The problem may be posed crudely as 
follows: If it is possible to rank-order government business 
according to the social and political significance of issues, 
where is then in different policy fields the cutting off point, 
above which the issues reach the authoritative collective 
decision-making arena, whereas other issues are handled in 
specialized sectorial arenas, at lower levels of the cabinet 
system? Is it possible to classify whole policy areas along this 
continuum? Or is the level of decision-making determined in 
accordance with some other independent variable than the 
objective or experienced significance of an issue?
For the needs of an overall analysis the issues on the 
government agenda may be placed in a simple hierarchical 
classification:1
(a) Routine administration: small habitual items which come 
up for regular review.
(b) Middle level issues: recurrent items which occur with 
some periodicity, but need not appear at regular intervals 
(budgetary process, governmental reorganization, tax reforms, 




























































































(c) New issues: policy items of more than middle level 
importance, typically appearing as an action or reaction of a 
decision-maker in a specific situation (for example, foreign 
policy initiatives, inflation, major disturbances in the labour 
market calling for government action to prevent economic damage).
(d) Strategic innovative decision-making (extensive national 
planning of wide policy sectors).
(3) The style of decision-making. It is not, however, enough 
to examine in which policy sectors or issue arenas a cabinet 
concentrates its activities and at which level of significance it 
makes policy decisions. The qualitative meaning of decisions 
made in different matters also varies, and there are differerent 
senses in which the government can be said to steer national 
policies. The decision-making style comprises here two 
dimensions: the strategy the government uses in approaching 
social problems and the relationship it has in decision-making 
situations with actors inside the cabinet system and political 
forces outside it.
Along the first dimension we can, following J.J. Richardson 
and his research group, discern either a striving towards active, 
anticipatory problem-solving, or a contentment with reactive, 
adaptive problem-solving. Along the latter dimension the council 
of ministers may take inside the cabinet system a number of 
alternative or parallel roles: the agenda-setting role, the 
policy coordination role, the policy ratification role and the 
policy direction role (effective collective decision-making). 
With regard to the attitude toward political forces outside the 
system, the decision-making is characterized by a bargaining 
style and consensus relationship in one direction, a 
confrontation style and imposition relationship in the other.3
The variation and interrelationships of all these factors 
are connected with many kinds of structural, situational and 
contextual factors. Figure 1 attempts to illustrate this 










































































































































































































Macro level investigations of economic and social policy 
decision-making indicate that there are differences between 
Western European states in the content and style of policy 
making. In his analysis of the economic policy of Western 
governments. Manfred G. Schmidt was able to differentiate between 
’active’ and 'passive' welfare states in the world of 1970s.“ And 
as Pekka Kosonen has clearly indicated, the four Nordic Countries 
- Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden - resorted in analogous 
situations to widely varying national strategies both in the era 
of economic growth and in the period of general uncertainty which 
followed.®
Explanations for these differences have been based on 
three different approaches. The broadest view is the national 
policy styles approach. which suggests that societies 
(governments) develop 'standard operating procedures' for making, 
implementing and legitimating policies and claims that it should 
be possible for political scientists 'to identify the main 
characteristics of the ways in which a given society formulates 
and implements its public policies’.® The second view is the 
policy sector approach, which claims that the nature of political 
issues themselves defines the politics associated with them. This 
approach denies that there is a single policy making process at 
the level of the national government; instead, there tend to be 
numerous relatively narrow and self-contained 'policy 
communities' or 'issue webs’ that seem to operate more or less 
autonomously.'1' The third view finally is the coalition structure 
approach. which departs from the understanding that both the area 
of decision-making as well as the operating style are determined 
by coalition structures, party pressure on cabinet, and quality 
of leadership.®
These approaches are not necessarily contradictory. The 
first of them pays attention to persisting features of 
governmental policy, the third, for its part, to the most 
variable topical characteristics. The second again emphasizes the 
subject matter of policy making as intervening variables.
Hence, the agenda-building process, the political relevance 
of issues and the style of policy-making can vary depending on 
the political system. the type of government, and the specific 
policy sectors (issue arenas). Short-term and long-term 



























































































independent variables. The clarification of this complex 
presupposes even in the most optimal case intensive analyses, a 
sample of country-specific, cabinet-specific, policy-specific and 
situation-specific case studies. Considering the poor access to 
empirical data - as a result of the principle of secrecy applied 
by most governments - we are forced, for practical purposes, to 
be satisfied with much less; in short, with broad comparative 
interpretations on the working styles and roles of governments in 
national political processes.
2. POLICY-MAKING LATITUDE OF MODERN CABINETS
The primary interest of a study examining the contents of 
cabinet decision-making is how extensive the area of public 
policy covered by governmental operations is, whether some policy 
sectors have been separated from its sphere of competence, and 
how freely the collective body can select the targets of 
decision-making. The concept of power latitude, presented by 
André-Paul Frognier'*, is used here in a somewhat modified form to 
include all these aspects.
The two leading functional principles of parliamentary 
governments are embodied in the wide range of their powers and 
the collective nature of decision-making. Only judicial business 
is for the most part excluded.
Still, the comparative analysis of governmental decision­
making has to depart from the general and well-known observation, 
that the objects of decision-making in the large area of public 
policies are only minimally defined and regulated by legal norms. 
Old constitutions hardly mention the duties and scope of powers 
of governments, and even the more recent ones fail to give any 
systematic or comprehensive treatment of what the government is 
responsible for. In most cases these documents seem to have been 
written "in traditional language and in terms of theories and 
models of government that were widely accepted in the nineteenth 
century” - in terms of the doctrine of separation of powers.10
Thus, Paragraph 2 of the Finnish Constitution stipulates 
that, in addition to the President, who exercises supreme 
executive power - these powers are specifically enumerated- 



























































































of the state". Perhaps the most rigorous and modern definition of 
the function of government can be found in the new Swedish 
Constitution: "The government governs the country. It responsible 
to the Riksdag". Most Western European constitutions in fact 
contain a definition of the govenment’s role in the form of a 
general phrase.- only some old monarchical systems like Eelgium. 
the Netherlands and United Kingdom remain silent.
The most visible legal and institutional restrictions are 
found in semi-presidential regimes like France and Finland. In 
both countries the constitution reserves a number of important 
powers for presidential decision-making, and to a varying degree 
the president exercises his authority independently. In Finland 
the division of functions, which only partly follows the 
guidelines established in the constitution, was stabilized since 
the Second World War to the extent that it is largely independent 
of the party-political relationship between the president and the 
majority of the cabinet. Most important, according to paragraph 
33 of the Constitution, the President determines Finland's 
relations with foreign states. As the position of the president 
has been strengthened, the interpretation of the legal norm has 
become enlarged, from mere formal decision-making to the planning 
of foreign policy and determining its general course. This means 
that the autonomy of the State Council is enormously curtailed at 
all levels of foreign policy agenda: it cannot appoint 
ambassadors, ratify trade agreements or establish plans for 
future strategies independently of the president.
As to the rest, the Chief of State and the government are 
strictly separated from each other, and the president does not 
have institutional means available to interfere with governmental 
business. In this respect the arrangement in France is evidently 
much more flexible: the authority to fix the agenda of cabinet 
meetings and to conduct the proceedings gives him the possibility 
of interfering decisively in its affairs. But on the other hand, 
in a conflict situation the president in a minority might also 
lose most of his real influence.
The other aspect of the question is whether the collective 
cabinet is capable of choosing at will the relevant issues from 
different policy fields and agenda levels: or is it obliged to 
give at any rate a formal sanction to certain kinds of decisions? 




























































































governments may be distinguished in Western Europe: (1) 'pure 
ministerial governments’ (United Kingdom and Belgium!: (2) ’pure 
collective governments' (Sweden); (3) 'mixed collective- 
ministerial governments'.
As Sir Ivor Jennings once remarked, 'the British Cabinet is 
not an "executive” instrument in the sense that it possesses 3nv 
legal powers’.11 When it has determined on a policy, it is 
carried out in the name of the appropriate minister or 
department. The consequence is that the cabinet (prime minister) 
is free to select the topics for its collective scrutiny. Sweden 
represents a totally opposite case: in that country the cabinet 
is constitutionally responsible for almost everything that is 
decided at the governmental level. The decision-making authority 
of individual ministers is minimal.
Paradoxically, these two extreme cases, based on indigenous 
traditions, approximate each other in practice. "Who decides on 
everything, decides on very little". The formal session of the 
Swedish cabinet is for the most part only a ritual, a decision­
making machine, which handles in round figures 30 000 issues 
every year. Therefore, it is not interesting to know which 
matters are presented for formal ratification, but rather which 
are taken up for preliminary consideration in informal 
negotiations - which accordingly are equivalent to the meetings 
of the British cabinet. All other issues are resolved on the 
basis of responsibility on individual ministers, although an 
extensive briefing system provides a sort of veto right to 
interested colleagues.
Other West European countries take their place somewhere 
between these two types in so far as both the cabinet and the 
ministries appear as the legally acknowledged decision-makers. 
The internal variation among this group is admittedly large: in 
some cases (for example, Ireland and the Netherlands) we find 
only a broad regulation of matters - for example, legislation, 
high level appointments, or issues bearing on 'general government 
policy’ or 'new policy schemes' - that always have to be 
discussed by the full cabinet; whereas in others (Austria and 
Finland) the law and the constitution prescribe a detailed list 
of those matters which must be decided by the whole Cabinet and 
also specify the areas of competence between different 



























































































of an organization, in which the lines of authority between 
different public actors are drawn rigidly by law and decree- 
both vertically and horizontally.
The importance of formal differences should not be 
exaggerated. 'The crisis of overload' has created the situation 
that in all conditions the activities of modern cabinets are 
selective. True collective deliberation extends only to a small 
part of the agenda, and the remaining issues are in reality 
resolved elsewhere, e.g., in ministries, in cabinet committees, 
in multilateral negotiations among a number of ministers. and so 
on. Factors and factor complexes such as enumerated in table 1 
determine the selection process as well as the real power 
latitude inside the relevant issue area.
But even though the formal arrangement of decision-making 
should not be able to produce clearly distinctive types of 
cabinets, it is still reasonable to expect it to have an impact 
on the everyday decision-making mode. In one party governments 
and in coalitions dominated by one big party, the difference is 
not necessarily significant, but at least in coalitions formed by 
equal partners the legal necessity to bring many administrative 
issues to a collective arena tends to cause the lowering of the 
level of the effective agenda. In a setting where competing 
parties are jealously watching each other and where all 
participants are formally responsible for decisions made, even 
issues belonging to routine administration - for example, lower 
level appointments - get easily politicized and become the object 
of 'give and take’ bargaining process between parties. The 
importance of routine administration and many middle level issues 
in day-to-day governmental processes is consequently emphasized, 
and a slow deliberative and incrementalist style of functioning 
becomes dominant.
3. GOVERNMENTAL AGENDA-BUILDING
Considered as a whole, governmental decision-making may be 
conceived rather as a rapid stream of myriads of issues through 
the cabinet system than as a set of static successive decision­
making situations. In striving to reach its fountainheads we have 




























































































There is a broad and a narrow definition of a government 
agenda. In a larger sense governmental agenda may be defined as 
that set of issues explicitly designed for the active and serious 
consideration of authoritative decision-makers inside the whole 
governmental machinery.13 In a narrower sense the agenda 
contains only issues which are subordinated to the effective 
decision-making of the collective cabinet. There is no clear line 
between these agenda levels, because on the one hand, the 
effectiveness of the collective treatment varies greatly, and 
because on the other hand the capacity of the cabinet to guide 
decisions taken at lower levels may be considerable. either in 
the form of general directions or anticipatory reactions. What 
can be seen in reality is hence rather a continuum and 
fluctuation from one type to another than a clear division into 
cabinet decision-making and ministerial decision-making.
Agenda-building is based on social problems which have 
became politicized by some means or another; matters of dispute 
between the parties in the electoral arena, or public issues that 
are commonly perceived by members of the political community as 
meriting public attention and as involving matters within the 
legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority.13 
Through various channels and gatekeepers some of these issues are 
introduced to the formal agenda of the government. Political 
parties of course play a major part in translating issues to 
agenda items. A majority party in government may be able to 
depend on its own platform, although in most cases it hardly can 
be directly transformed into government policy. A political party 
seeking large support easily identifies with problems that are 
salient to many segments of the populace, and the objectives are 
presented in general terms and with considerable ambiguity. The 
operationalization of the platform is an ongoing process through 
the whole period in office, perhaps to a large extent as 
responses to many situational factors.
In operational solutions government programmes or 
agreements, drawn up when a coalition is formed. must be treated 
as basic documents indicating the agenda-building process. There 
are varying views about the importance of government programmes, 
based on rational ex ante reflection. Jean Blondel's hypothesis 
is that at least in limited coalitions the government programme, 




























































































detail, profoundly restricts the list of issues and excludes 
areas susceptible to conflictual behaviour to the degree that 
"the government is in some sense viewed as a body in charge of 
implementation of what has been decided during the process of 
cabinet formation".1"* Gregory M. Luebbert for his part assumes 
that the number of decisive preferences is actually quite small. 
because not participating in government has high cost and because 
detailed policy schemes generate dissension inside the own party 
as well. In the effort to minimize disunity, party leaders will 
limit the decisive preferences not only to contested principles 
of direction, but also to those principles that are of the 
greatest concern to their party.13
I would think that the reality is somewhere between these 
two concepts. A review of nine Western European countries 
indicates that in six countries (Austria. Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) a new government always 
formulates a programme irrespective of its political complexion. 
In Britain the electoral manifesto of the winning party serves 
this purpose; In France the practice varies; and only in Spain is 
the promulgation of a programme proclamation not an established 
custom. The importance of the programme is emphasized by the fact 
that it is presented to parliament for discussion (in Britain as 
the Queen's Speech, in the Netherlands as a ’government 
statement'). Only in Finland the programme or agreement, which is 
presented for the minutes of the State Council, is an internal 
affair of the coalition.
In Figure 2 these countries have been placed in a two- 
dimensional space according to the structure of the government 
programme. The scope refers to the number of policy sectors 
covered in the document. The degree of specification of 
programmatic issues varies, but there is apparently a general 




























































































Figure 2. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES
Vague and manifesto-like
Degree of Somewhat specific
specificity
Detailed and specific
The latest trend has apparently been a shift from brief and 
narrow proclamations to large and specific agreements. An 
analysis of data from Finland indicates that with the beginning 
of the 1970s the programmes have been more and more adapted to 
the idea of national planning in the specification of their aims 
and means. On the other hand, the presentation of fundamental 
value goals has been almost totally abandoned. The technocratic 
tone in government programmes has been considerably 
strengthened. 1(1
But it is still a valid generalization that the degree of 
concretization and specification of a programme decreases sharply 
when moving from lower to higher agenda levels. It is possible to 
negotiate detailed agreements on middle level recurrent issues- 
e.g. the next year's budget - but when large new issue areas are 
raised, only good purposes and goals are most probably recorded 
in the final document. The actual planning process and 
specification of means - which is the real source of 
disagreements - takes place later in the government. The 
programme of the first conservative-socialist coalition in 
Finland - formed in April 1987 - contained among other things one 
important new item for both of the partners: tax reform for 
Conservatives, reform of industrial relations for Social 
Democrats. With respect to the general goals they reached an 
agreement easily, but the following year was filled with heated 
discussions about specification of these goals as well as the 
proper means to achieve them.
At least in Finland, many more ex-ministers interviewed 



































































































government programme. Even if very detailed and specific, it 
still is in coalition cabinets a sort of insurance policy, taken 
out just in case of bad times. Party leaders are well aware that 
the real settlement of the issues they are concerned with will 
take place later; by including many kinds of issues within the 
government agreement they seek tentative assurance of a voice in 
that settlement. x~r Parts of the programmes tend to distort to 
pseudo-agendas, which reflect more the hopes of participants than 
real potentialities and are used to assuage the frustrations of 
constituency groups.
Furthermore, a cabinet agenda can never be fixed: new 
problems, goals, and solutions are introduced weekly and monthly 
during a policy process. When a new minister enters his office, 
he finds high stacks of unsigned documents, half-finished plans 
and undeveloped ideas, and officials, as well as various interest 
groups in the field present him every day with new demands and 
policy proposals. As a broad generalization, the effective agenda 
of most cabinets is filled, amidst the stress of overload and 
partly depending on chance, with middle level recurrent issues 
and new issues below "high policy” level. One thing leads to 
another, and initiatives and impulses coming from many sides are 
mixed together in the complicated preparation process. Everything 
considered, an extensive policy decision can be the net result of 
a decision-making process so complex and conflictual, that it is 
not at all apparent, whose interests and efforts have, in the 
final analysis, dictated the decision and what is the basic 
ideology of a new law.
Government programmes are in most cases the only documented 
description of the task area of a cabinet. A comparative 
analysis of them would offer - with the reservations presented 
above - a possibility of observing changes in political attitudes 
and the development of the overall position of governments in 
policy formulation and policy implementation. The^ cursory 
examination of data in Austria and Finland has shown the - not 
very surprising - result that in the first place economic, in the 
second place social and in the third place cultural problems 
dominated governmental goal-setting in the 1960s and 1970s.1'’ 
Exactly the same rank-ordering was produced by a summary 
evaluation of their relative importance in Western European 




























































































only in the fourth place and, for example, environmental problems 
«ere mentioned only in passing as belonging to the most central 
issues.
These data undoubtedly reflect the objective structure of 
the social problem field, but to a certain extent the orientation 
of activities is also dependent on more situational and personal 
factors. There are phases when particular policy sectors are 
given priority because a particular prime minister is interested 
and appoints the right ministers; and there are large areas in 
which nothing appears to happen. Ministerial posts have a varying 
degree of attractiveness in the eyes of potential ministers. 
Evaluations depend largely on the possibilities different posts 
offer for visible and effective policy-making; but strong 
personalities find their way to highly regarded posts, and these 
very persons are able to make use of the potentialities.
The members of the research group were asked to assess 
ministerial posts in their own country in three ranking classes: 
high prestige posts, middle level posts and low prestige posts. 
The rankings were most identical in the first class: almost 
without exception the Foreign Minister and the Minister of 
Finance received the highest ranking, and the Minister of Justice 
as well as the minister responsible for economic policies were 
not far behind them. The central activity of most prime ministers 
shows itself in these same areas. The second ranking class in the 
scoring table was formed by the Ministry of the Interior, plus 
such major spending sectors as health and social security, 
culture and education, as well as commerce and industry. The 
least esteemed policy sectors are apparently communications and 
transport, agriculture (the only exception being Ireland), labour 
and environment. The appreciation of the Ministry of Defence 
varies insofar as it is in several larger countries regarded as 
one of the most important departments; in such countries as 
Finland. Ireland, the Netherlands and Norway, where national 
defence policy does not open possibilities for action, it remains 
rather uninteresting and hardly attractive.
The most important portfolios have a great appeal for all 
participants, but otherwise parties try to 'colonise' certain 
ministries in the sense that they repeatedly reserve specific 
policy areas under their control. This tendency is the more 



























































































Hence socialists in several countries have a preference for 
social affairs, employment. housing and welfare: Christian 
Democrats for education and culture: Conservatives and Liberals 
possibly for defence, justice and industry.
In 1987. the Finnish State Council handled in formal 
plenary sessions a total amount of 5 060 agenda items. A final 
decision was reached on 2 511 items, and the rest - about half of 
all the items considered - were presented as the cabinet's 
recommendations to the presidential session for final resolution. 
In the majority of these matters, the effective decision was 
dictated by the cabinet as well.
Four ministries with the highest number of agenda items- 
Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs and Ministry of Education - were responsible for 
56 % of all cabinet business, four most passive - Ministry of 
Labour, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior and 
Ministry of the Environment - only for 11 %. The summary 
functional classification of state activities suggested by 
Richard Rose1’ gives the following numerical distribution:




2 536 items 50.1 ” 
1 103 ” 21.9 Z 
1 116 " 23.0 Z 
5 060 " 100.0 Z
A vertical analysis of these basic statistics, which 
measures the qualitative categories of cabinet agenda, reveals 
that 27.0 % of the items applied to parliamentary legislation 
and government decrees, 2.2 Z to national planning and 'decisions 
in principle'. This information leads to the tentative 
conclusion, that of all the issues presented in official cabinet 
meetings, about one third applies to norm decisions and other 
policy decisions and two thirds to individualized administrative
decisions. In the latter category, the personnel management and 
questions related to various government commissions were the 
largest single issue group (37.2 Z, of all items). But the Finnish 




























































































institutions. the granting of licenses to operate chemist's 
shops, and even the sanctioning minor deals in real estate on 
behalf of the state.
This kind of basic information about the governmental agenda 
is hardly accessible in most of the Western European countries, 
but even where it concerns Finland, it doesn't provide 
sufficient answers to the questions posed. The first place taken 
by the Foreign Ministry in the quantitative count does not mean 
that the cabinet would have been in 1987 especially concerned 
with foreign policy, and the dominant number of administrative 
decisions does not necessarily mean that the policy deliberation 
function would be lost in overwhelming routine. On the 17th of 
March in 1988 the cabinet decided that a large legislative 
package on industrial relations be given to Parliament for its 
consideration. The decision was reached in a summary fashion, 
without any discussion among the ministers. And still it was a 
major issue which had been under intensive preparation for one 
year and which had generated heated debate, both inside and 
outside the cabinet, more than any other actual reform project. 
But the preparation and debate were performed in other arenas, 
primarily in ministerial committees and informal cabinet 
meetings, the working schedule of which is not open for public 
scrutiny.
4. POLICY-MAKING STYLE
In the first section of the paper a reference was made to 
the policy-making model formulated by Richardson, et al., which 
combines two variables, the cabinet’s approach to social 
problem-solving, and the relationship between government and 
other actors in the policy process. Concerning the first
variable, the government can take either an active and 
anticipatory attitude toward new issues rising to the government 
agenda, or then have a more reactive and adaptive approach. It is 
also possible to speak of a more incrementalist and a more 
rationalist approach to problem-solving. On the other hand, a 
government may be willing to 'deal' with organized interests in 
society, to be accommodating and concerned to reach a consensus 



























































































authoritative power, towards imposing decisions notwithstanding 
opposition from other actors. Such an examination proceeds 
accordingly outside the confines of government machinery to 
evaluate the social consequenses of everything that happens in 
the cabinet system.








Provided that a detailed empirical analysis were possible, 
the different policy styles could then be compared between 
political systems, government types, policy sectors and varying 
situations.
Locating Western European countries as such in different 
quadrants of Figure 3 would mean an excessive simplification of 
the empirical world, but in a loose sense it should be possible 
to speak of the dominant tendency in some national policy styles. 
On one hand, we can see the slow-moving, deliberative and 
consensual policy-making mode in the small Nordic countries. The 
characterization given by Olof Ruin about Sweden probably applies 
to all of them: 'In practice, this has meant that policy-makers, 
in their day-to-day political decision-making, should seek 
agreement among participants and avoid conflicts: should try to 
build large majorities for policies rather than force their 
standpoint on minorities; and compromise rather than cling 
rigidly to their own policy preferences. Furthermore, this has 
meant an emphasis on trying to direct events rather than letting 
events dictate policy, on being active and innovative rather than 
reactive.'IO Policy-making is typically a gradual process of 
'piecemeal social engineering'. Sweden is unique even in this 
area: the commission system in Sweden is even mere open and 




























































































governments have followed a specifically anticipatory strategy in 
social problem solving.
In sharp contrast to this is presumably the traditional 
imposition style of the French government policy, which. it is 
true, has two faces: it may appear in a routine, bureaucratic 
style of decision-making ('immobilisme'), or then in markedly 
innovative interventions, based on centralized planning, in order 
to modernise certain policy sectors or solve individual problems.
'The mode of domination' was an important explanatory factor 
in Heikki Paloheimo's study on the economic development of 
capitalist states in the 1970s. By combining two variables, the 
extent of state economic intervention and the impact of group 
corporatism in decision-making, he was able to distinguish 
between four modes of domination: (1) corporatist-interventionist 
(extensive intervention, strong corporatism), (2) interventionist 
(extensive intervention, weaker corporatism), (3) corporatist 
(less extensive regulation, strong corporatism), and (4) 
pluralist (less regulation, less pluralism). Among Western 
European countries, Sweden, Norway and Austria were identified as 
belonging to the first category; Belgium, the Netherlands, 
France, West Germany, Finland and Denmark to the second, 
Switzerland alone to the third, and Ireland, the United Kingdom 
and Italy to the fourth.21 Such a summary classification on a 
macro-level does not, it is true, sort out the decision-making 
modes of cabinets in any great detail.
In a concrete analysis it would probably be more 
interesting to explore differences in styles between different 
governments and policy sectors. C.H. Sisson once claimed that in 
Britain the cabinet, including the Prime Minister, are ill 
placed or badly equipped to wrench policy from its established 
direction. Centrally located are the officials, who are the 
Queen's servants and not the politician’s; when ministers change 
'they raise their eyebrows and continue as before, only noting 
that certain emphases must be changed'.22 The assessment is 
supposedly valid as far as most routine activities and recurrent 
middle level issues are concerned; but the cabinet can certainly 
have an influence on strategic aspects of a new policy by setting 
the agenda, scheduling the activities and giving directions as to 
the outlines of policy contents. It is reasonable to hypothesize 



























































































of the cabinet remains roughly the same for long periods and 
uhen the prime minister is not a powerful task leader (e.g., 
Finland 1966-87); more apparent when a rigidly structured party 
system leads after periodic elections to changing cabinet 
compositions and to a more influential prime ministerial 
leadership. In this sense a comparison between for example, the 
Callaghan cabinet (1976-79) and the Thatcher cabinets (1979-87) 
in Great Britain or between the Brandt cabinet (1969-74) and the 
Schmidt cabinet (1974-82) on the one hand, and the Kohl cabinet 
(1982-87) on the other in West Germany could be revealing.
As far as different policy sectors are concerned, France and 
Finland belong in one respect to the same category: their 
divergent authoritative style in foreign and defence policy must 
be connected with the activity and leadership position of the 
head of state in these same issue areas. In both countries the 
president keeps a careful watch over the appointment of the 
Foreign minister and the Minister of Defence, who also may be 
looked upon very often as his personal trustees. But the 
important difference is that whereas French foreign policy has 
on many occasions been active and innovative in character, 
Finnish foreign policy has represented - at least after the mid­
seventies (and defence policy has been traditionally so) a 
reactive/adaptive type of policy-making. Otherwise the 
impressionistic delineation of policy styles in Western European 
countries reinforces expectations, according to which social and 
health policy, as well as economic and finance policy are 
particularly susceptible to bargaining style and negotiation 
relationship between government and group actors.
It is conceivable that the same differences between policy 
sectors have been accentuated in the most recent development. To 
the degree that the innovative policies of the 1950s and 1960s 
were established, perhaps in a reduced amplitude, as normal 
public functions, the focus of activities moved in the direction 
of ministries and the trend toward forming autonomous and self- 
contained policy communities was strengthened. In a segmented 
system these communities have their own clientele relationships, 
preparation machinery and decision-making style.
Situational factors are connected here with the long-term 
trend of policy-making modes. It is reasonable to assume that the 




























































































presented by Figure 3 clockwise from one quadrant to another. The 
traditional bureaucratic 'policy adoption style' presupposes a 
low level of state activities, a low degree of organisation, a 
considerable amount of political illiteracy, and a hierarchical 
structure of authority. In weekly consultations the cabinet 
ministers are informed of routine measures and they easily 
acquiesce to policies without many alternatives left open to 
them. With the growth of resources and expectations the 
government is activized, it relies on more rational preparation 
methods than before, and it resorts to stronger measures- 
regulative and distributive - in order to direct social and 
political developments. The importance of the cabinet in setting 
agendas and formulating policies is considerable, and final 
policy decisions are the result of a complex interplay between 
different levels of the cabinet system. The mobilization and 
organization of the citizenry forces the cabinet to open a 
multitude of negotiation and coordination relationships, and the 
proportion of consensus policy compared with imposition policy 
is growing when public activity is highly developed. Policy 
stagnation, caused by increasing welfare and/or weakening of the 
economic foundation, leads to segmentation, to closed negotiation 
relationships and to the weakening of the cabinet's role to 
ratification of decisions taken elsewhere. Conceivably, such a 
circuit was completed in several of the West European countries 
before the end of the 1970s.
The culmination of a political cycle in crises calling for 
new solutions opens alternative routes for the development. It is 
natural to close the circle and come back to imposition politics 
in a spirit of reactive problem solving - "it is extremely 
difficult to negotiate sacrifices". This is what actually has 
happened in several countries since the early 1980s. But 
searching for new solutions could also stimulate an anticipatory 
style of decision-making and the policy direction role of the 
cabinet; certain operations of Thatcher cabinets illustrate this 
tendency. Or then negotiation relationships may be preserved and 
even emphasized in a society characterized by strong 
corporatism. In a setting where a multitude of organized groups 
are increasingly protective of their interests, the environment 




























































































Perhaps this model is also applicable. divorced from total 
historical development. to individual policy sectors beginning 
at the stage when their central issues achieve political 
relevance and are elevated to the governmental agenda.
5. Conclusions
The fragmentary information thus far available is sufficient 
to demonstrate that Western European cabinets have for the most 
part a largely varying control over the governmental business, 
depending on differences in institutions. political 
constellation, the scope of government business and 
administrative culture. The collective cabinets of two small 
countries, Sweden and Finland, are making, even in today’s 
circumstances, attempts to combine the political and the 
administrative level, from the determination of broad policy 
lines to day-to-day routines. They are not able to do all of this 
effectively, but the latitude of their formal competence at any 
rate provides an opportunity for a systematic selection of issues 
to be discussed and an extensive control of the administrative 
field. In multi party governments reciprocal rivalry and formal 
responsibility for decisions made may result in the politization 
of trivial matters and an excessive reliance on arbitration among 
parties.
At the other extreme the functioning of the British cabinet 
is determined by prime ministerial leadership. The head of the 
cabinet selects, perhaps partly at random, a small number of 
items to the agenda, and other questions of 'high policy value’ 
are settled somewhere between the cabinet and the ministerial 
levels, in cabinet committees or discussions between ministers. 
In some other countries, for instance, in Austria, West Germany 
and the Netherlands, the traditional administrative orientation, 
professionalism, and autonomy of ministers put the cohesion of 
the cabinet on trial, and a plenary session might then resemble 
'a loose board of managers' or 'joint sessions of cabinet 
committees'. The Spanish cabinet has been characterized as 
'technical', the Italian cabinet as 'fragmented', the functional 




























































































In the framework of their specific national character, 
cabinets develop varying profiles depending, among other things, 
on persons and political constellations as well as on the 
external situation. Still, the Finnish union leader Arvo Hautala, 
Minister of the Interior in a broad coalition in the 1970s, did 
not direct his criticism to his own cabinet, but to the 
government in general:
'What irritated me in the functioning of the cabinet was, 
that I did not see any methodical grip in it. The work drifted 
here and there, the departments were doing all kinds of things. 
That way a private firm would have gone bankrupt in one month or 
in one year at the latest. I don't pretend that the officials 
would not have been busy, but the management was accidental. 
Sufficient connections are lacking between different departments, 
not to talk about a joint planning system. The government 
programme may be in the process of preparation for a long time, 
and it is disputed to the amount that for outside people it seems 
to be the most important thing in the world; but it was not held 
in any value, not at least in the government where I was 
sitting. . . '
Hautala adapted to an individual case the same criticism 
that has been directed to modern cabinets in general; they are 
managerially inefficient and they are too ad hoc, dominated by 
scattered and casual decision-making. A modern business leader 
would certainly accept this criticism; but a political cabinet is 
not a business firm but a political body, where the exigency for 
parliamentary responsiveness and responsibility take first 
priority and compel compromise over technical effectiveness.
The cabinet system was developed for the needs of a simple 
government in a bygone society, in which the level of 
mobilization was low and the number of problems suitable to be 
solved by political decisions was small; and it contained a 
rather primitive mechanism for the realization of democratic 
responsiveness: a possibility for a change of the leading group 
at any moment in a spirit of political amateurism. But the 
complexity in policy-making has since then enormously increased, 
and the stress connected with the governmental agenda itself has 
been intensified in the latest development. beginning from the 
1970s on. It is sufficient to refer to three aspects presented in 



























































































expected to deal with has vastly increased, and many issues 
(economic crisis, unemployment, nuclear power) have been 
difficult to solve, (2) The 'rhythm' of politics has speeded up; 
both domestic and international issues emerge very quickly and 
are also removed from the agenda quickly. (3) Openness in the 
making and implementing of policies has also increased, which has 
resulted in prolonged decision-making processes and has curtailed 
the effectiveness of negotiation systems.
"The crisis of overload and governability" has accordingly 
caused an essential change in the decision-making environment. In 
spite of this, the functions of governments are still habitually 
assessed on the basis of a traditional view, according to which 
the cabinet as a college of ministers is - or at least it is 
meant to be - an integrated policy formulating body. But it is 
always more and more difficult to isolate this body from the 
colossal machinery behind it. The parliamentary form has been 
adapted to the development by preserving the general political 
leadership in its original form as "the committee of the 
powerful", and at the same time by enlarging enormously the web 
of specialized leadership positions in the form of ministerial 
decision-making units. A modern government is a complex system, 
in which there is a gradual transition - through ministerial 
committees and working groups - from general to specialized 
political leadership and from there further on to the 
bureaucracy, which is the major resource of the political 
cabinet. This three-tail comet is tied by one branch to the civil 
service, by the other to parliament, and by the third to the 
party system.
In this system there is a perpetual interaction among 
different levels. The vast amount of government business, 
dominated by administrative routines and middle level issues of 
different fields, is handled at the level of specialized 
leadership; only a minimal part of it reaches the cabinet level. 
In most countries the plenary session is in fact no more intended 
to be a forum in which full ministers, sitting collectively, make 
all important decisions and formulate policy plans. "Cabinet is 
the forum for determining what cannot be settled elsewhere - in 
departments, by ministers, or by cabinet committees. It must 
arbitrate between ministers, make difficult policy decisions and 



























































































advise is put under the political microscope... Cabinet is a 
forum that must be judged by political, not managerial 
criteria.
In this perspective the informal character of most European 
cabinets is an asset, because it flexibly provides the ministers 
with an opportunity to become involved in varying issues as the 
circumstances might demand, without moulding their activities 
into a constant pattern. It is conceivable that public policies 
in different 'new' issue areas develop in stages or cycles: 
introduction, incremental expansion, stabilization, and 
reformulation.2-7 The intensity of cabinet involvement varies in 
different parts of the cycle: it is obviously most effective in 
introductory stages and initial expansion and decreases after 
that sharply as the new function is stabilized. In this way the 
substantial focal points in cabinet decision-making may shift 
along in time from one area to another, and the total intensity 
of its action may also vary according to actual needs.
Even if the role of the cabinet were limited to this, its 
impact on the formulation of public policies is not to be 
underrated. It does not define the governmental agenda, but it is 
able, if willing, to set preferences and raise major issues to 
serious discussion. It decides on some items; it steers the 
preparation and settlement of a host of others by formulating 
general directions; probably more often it integrates, 
coordinates, arbitrates and legitimises, and occasionally also 
reverses decisions made in the lower strata of the governmental 
system. The position of the cabinet plenary session has altered- 
but its status might be higher and its role more important than 
ever.
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